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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates whether short-term debt is related to earnings management. Short-term debt is divided into 
total current liabilities, debt in current liabilities and short-term borrowings. In addition, this study examines how 
short-term debt is related to how firms manage their earnings. I use discretionary accruals and real operating 
decisions as the earnings management method. 
 
The study finds that debt in current liabilities only has a statistically significant impact on accrual earnings 
management, and short-term borrowings are only shown to have a statistically significant impact on real earnings 
management. These results indicate that managers engage in accrual earnings management of debt included in 
current liabilities and use real earnings management of short-term borrowings from financial institutions. 
 
Therefore, this evidence indicates that managers engage in accrual earnings management of debt in included 
current liabilities when they face the liquidity risk of short-term debt, and the firms with debt financing constraints 
are likely to manage real earnings in spite of enhanced firm monitoring by lenders such as financial institutions. The 
findings in this study may have implications in the debate about the monitoring function of financial institutions 
such as banks. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
rior studies suggest that when firms raise funds through debt financing, the firms should consider not 
only the debt ratio but also the type of debt, maturity, collateral, and covenants. In firms with high 
liabilities, there is increased attention on earnings and risk according to the debt maturity structure. 
Long-term debt causes ineffective management of funds, owing to the existence of surplus cash; however, in the 
case of short-term debt, because the debt maturity is short and the frequency of new loans increases, maturity 
extension costs will be charged or liquidity risk  will emerge, making conversion difficult. When debt ratio is 
considered to carry a serious risk of default, there should be more focus on the liquidity of short-term debt than the 
ineffective management of long-term debt.  
 
To avoid liquidity risk, there are some corporations that maintain debt maturity by improving financial strength 
(Stulz, 1990), but there are other corporations that try to increase earnings to meet the terms of loans (Gupta and 
Fields, 2006). In particular, if a company carefully considers liquidity risk, they will be more able to manage 
earnings. Gupta and Fields (2006) show that the shorter the debt, the more earnings management. In addition, in the 
case of a low credit level, there is an enhanced relation between earnings management and short-term debt, and 
auditor characteristics diminish this relation. 
 
However, lenders such as financial institutions have characteristics such as low asymmetry of information, high 
intelligence analysis capabilities, and lower transaction costs related to investment in companies (Diamond, 1984; 
Fama, 1985; Bhattacharya and Chiesa, 1995; Bharath et al., 2008). Thus, if managers are manipulating earnings, 
P 
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lenders such as banks will be more likely to monitor them. This can discourage managers from misbehaving 
(Gertner et al., 1994; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994). 
 
Although earnings management appears during short-term debt in the U.S. market where the debt contract is stricter, 
there have been no previous studies considering short-term debt to financial institutions. In Korea, debt to financial 
institutions does not affect accrual-based earnings management (Kim and Park, 2014). Therefore, this study 
investigates whether or not earnings management appears during short-term debt, with a particular focus on debt to 
financial institutions and debt in current liabilities. In addition, this study examines whether firms use discretionary 
accruals or real operating decisions to manage earnings. I use discretionary accruals as a proxy for accrual-based 
earnings management, and use abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal production costs, and abnormal 
discretionary expenses as proxies for real earnings management. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. I review prior literature and develop hypotheses in section 2. Section 3 describes 
data selection and empirical method. Empirical results are presented and discussed in section 4, and I conclude in 
section 5. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Earnings management is related to earnings adjustment and focused on a particular debt covenant theory (Gupta and 
Fields, 2006). According to general debt contract theory, when debt ratio is high, a company increases net income 
through accounting choices. Previous research within the U.S. has generally confirmed the validity of the contract 
theory.  
 
In their Korea study, Park et al. (2006) found that when debt ratio becomes high, capital is financed outside the 
company. To decrease this cost, the company intentionally raises the earnings level. Park (2001) shows that a 
company with a high debt ratio, even if it does not have a debt contract, is likely to adjust earnings to decrease the 
cost of debt capital and to make it easy to receive additional capital financing. However, some cases show 
companies trying to adjust earnings downward when debt ratio increases (Healy and Palepu, 1990; Beneish and 
Press, 1993; DeAngelo et al., 1994; Becker et al., 1998; Ashbaugh et al., 2003).  
 
According to the covenant-based hypothesis, a company is highly likely to violate a particular debt covenant. 
Therefore, it tries to conduct an accounting choice to increase net income or to draw future profit. In accordance 
with this hypothesis, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) show that companies violating the covenant conduct an earnings 
adjustment to increase reported earnings during the current and prior year. In contrast, Sweeney (1994) finds that 
companies conduct accounting choices to increase reported earnings after the violation of the debt covenant. The 
empirical evidence is inconclusive. However, both studies agree that a company likely to violate a debt covenant 
raises earnings to decrease the possibility of violating the debt covenant and will conduct accounting choices to 
increase cash flow. 
 
The possibility of violating a particular debt covenant is related to the character of the debt. Paek and Choi (1999) 
report that companies that are expected to owe high corporate taxes report more adjustments to decrease accounting 
earnings as compared to companies without high corporate taxes. This indicates that the effort to minimize corporate 
tax precedes earnings adjustments motivated by the increase of debt ratio. Moon (2007) finds that companies with a 
higher debt ratio report more earnings changes and the discretionary accounting choice factor of their CEOs is not 
strong.  
 
Reported earnings are generally regarded as an important factor in appraisals of a firm’s risk. Short-term debt 
increases a firm’s liquidity risk. If the liquidity risk of short-term debt is higher than the burden of long-term debt, 
the firm needs to conduct earnings manipulation. The decision whether to conduct earnings management depends on 
the situation of the firm. Ahn (2004) suggests that lenders to a company that has a higher debt ratio monitor the 
company's activities and watch the CEO for earnings management.  
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When the risk of the total debt contract is high, the company manipulates earnings upward. This relation is 
significantly stronger for firms that have much more short-term debt (Gupta and Fields, 2006). Fung and Goodwin 
(2013) report that short-term debt is positively associated with accrual-based earnings management and this relation 
is significantly weaker for firms that are of higher creditworthiness.  
 
Managers achieve real activities manipulation by altering the level or the nature of economic activities and achieve 
accrual-based earnings management by choosing accounting policies and estimating accruals (DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994; Fung and Goodwin, 2013). Managers have used accrual-based and real-based earnings 
management complementarily. Therefore, this study expects that short-term debt is related to accrual-based earnings 
management and real-based earnings management. The hypotheses are the following: 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relation between total current liabilities and accrual-based earnings management.  
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relation between total current liabilities and real-based earnings management. 
 
Financial institutions provide most external debt financing for firms. With repeated contracting with borrowers, 
financial institutions continuously gather information and update their evaluations of firm creditworthiness. Myers et 
al. (2003) suggest that a firm has to approach lenders more often to obtain new loans when debt maturity is short. 
More frequent evaluations are likely to serve as a monitoring tool. Monitoring by lenders of short-term debt of firms 
with low liquidity risk can increase accounting quality. The relationship between debt to financial institutions and 
earnings management is not clear. Therefore, this study uses debt in current liabilities and debt to financial 
institutions as the proxies of short-term debt for investigating this relationship. In addition, it develops the below 
sub-hypotheses for examining which type of earnings management is used.  
 
Sub-hypothesis 1-1: There is a positive relation between debt in current liabilities and accrual-based earnings 
management. 
 
Sub-hypothesis 1-2: There is a positive relation between short-term borrowings and accrual-based earnings 
management. 
 
Sub-hypothesis 2-1: There is a positive relation between debt in current liabilities and real-based earnings 
management. 
 
Sub-hypothesis 2-2: There is a positive relation between short-term borrowings and real-based earnings 
management. 
 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Research Methods 
 
This study uses the following regression model to find out the association between short-term debt—in particular, 
short-term debt to financial institutions and debt included in current liabilities—and earnings management. The 
absolute value of discretionary accruals is used as the dependent variable. Following Dechow et al. (1995) and 
Kothari et al. (2005), this study measures the magnitude of discretionary accruals. The independent variables are 
total current liabilities, debt included in current liabilities, and short-term borrowings as proxies for short-term debt. 
Total current liabilities (TCLi,t) represents liabilities due within one year, including the current portion of long-term 
debt. Debt included in current liabilities (DCLi,t) represents the total amount of short-term notes and the current 
portion of long-term debt (debt due in one year). Short-term borrowings (STBi,t) are the average of short-term 
borrowings and are usually in the form of  lines of credit with banks. The other variables are control variables.  
LEVi,t is the total leverage of a firm; CFOi,t is the operating activities net cash flow; SIZEi,t is firm size; MTBi,t is 
growth opportunity; ROAi,t+1, is firm performance; Big 5i,t is a Big 5 audit firm; and log TA i,t-1 is total accruals in 
the last year. LOSSi,t represents firms reporting losses for three consecutive years, and AUDCHi,t is changes in the 
auditing firm. The model is also controlled by years and group of industry: 
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Next, this study examines the relation between real earnings management and short-term debt by estimating the 
following regressions: 
 
tititi CONTROLSTDREM ,2,10, +++=  (2) 
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Where REMi,t is abnormal CFO, abnormal production costs, or abnormal discretionary expenses. The abnormal 
CFO is expected to be significantly negative, abnormal production costs to be significantly positive and abnormal 
discretionary expenses to be significantly negative. In addition, I calculate a single variable by combining these 
individual variables, and the combined variable (CREMi,t) is computed as the sum of the standardized variables. 
This study uses these four variables as proxies for real earnings management. Control variables are the same as 
equation (1). 
 
Research Variables 
 
Accrual-Based Earnings Management and Real Earnings Management 
 
Following Dechow et al. (1995), I measure the magnitude of discretionary accruals to estimate accrual earnings 
management. I run the following regression model for every industry and each year to estimate the α1 and α2 
coefficients: 
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Where TAi,t is total accruals in year t for firm i; A i,t-1 is total assets in year t-1 for firm i; ΔREVi,t is the change in 
sales from year t-1 to year t for firm i; ΔRECi,t is the change in accounts receivable from year t-1 to year t for firm i; 
PPEi,t is total gross of property, plant and equipment in year t for firm i; and  is the error term in year t for firm i. 
In particular, total accruals are net income minus cash flow from operations. 
 
Following Kothari et al. (2005), I run the following regression model for every industry and year to estimate the α1 
and α2  coefficients: 
 
TAi,t
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=α0 +α1(
1
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I calculate non-discretionary accruals as the estimated value from equation (4) and (5), and obtain the absolute value 
of discretionary accruals as equation (8): 
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Next, following Dechow et al. (1995) and Roychowdhury (2006), this study uses abnormal cash flows from 
operations, abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary expenses as the proxies for real earnings 
management. To estimate the models, I run the following regressions for every industry and each year: 
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Where CFOt are cash flows from operations in year t; At-1 is total assets in year t-1; St is sales revenues in year t; and 
ΔSt is the change in sales revenues from year t-1 to year t. Production costs (PRODt) are computed as the cost of 
goods sold plus change in inventories from year t-1 to year t; and discretionary expenses (DISEXPt) are computed as 
selling, general and administrative expenses (SG&A) plus advertising expenses plus research and development 
expenses (R&D). 
 
Abnormal value is the actual value minus the normal value for each firm year. I calculate normal value using 
estimated coefficients. Abnormal cash flows from operations (ABCFO) are the actual cash flows from operations 
minus the normal cash flows from operations; abnormal production costs (ABPRO) are the actual discretionary 
expenses minus the normal production costs; and abnormal discretionary expenses (ABDISEXP) are the actual 
discretionary expenses minus the normal discretionary expenses. Also, a combined variable (CREMi,t) is computed 
as the sum of the standardized variables. Consistent with Zang (2006) and Cohen and Zarowin (2008), I multiply 
abnormal CFO and abnormal discretionary expenses by –1. Therefore, the higher the amount of two variables, the 
more likely it is that the firm is engaging in earnings management. 
 
)1()1(, ×++×= ABDISEPABPRODABCFOCREM ti  (13) 
 
Control Variables 
 
Control variables are included based on the findings of prior studies. Leverage ratio potentially affects firm 
performance and debt possession (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). The leverage ratio denoted as LEV is measured 
with debt/asset to control for any potential impacts. Management tends to increase earnings if operating activities net 
cash flow is negative (Park, 2003). Therefore, this study uses the ratio of operating activities net cash flow to total 
assets in year t-1, denoted as CFO as a control variable. The larger the firm, the more likely it is to be a political 
target. So management tends to decrease the accounting performance to decrease the political cost (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1990). Therefore, this study uses the natural log of total assets denoted as SIZE to control for firm size. 
 
Firms with higher growth opportunities increase their earnings according to the estimated profit of analysts to 
protect the expropriation of minority shareholders (Yoon, 2001; Skinner and Sloan, 2002). This study uses the ratio 
of the book value to market value, denoted as MTB, to control for growth opportunity. DeFond and Park (1997) 
report that future financial performance is positively associated with the amount of accruals. Therefore, I include 
future financial performance as a control variable. This study uses the ratio of income before extraordinary items in 
year t+1 to total assets in year t-1, denoted as FNI (DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998). This study includes the total 
accruals of the previous term to control for the reversal phenomenon of earnings management (Ashbaugh et al., 
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2003; Becker et al., 1998). lagTA is measured by the ratio of net income minus operating activities net cash flow in 
year t-1 to total assets in year t-2. 
 
Becker et al. (1998) insists that Big 4 auditors raise the quality of audits more than those from non-Big 4 firms. 
Firms audited by Big 4, 5, and 6 auditors are related to lower levels of discretionary accruals. Therefore, I include 
the Big 5 to control for this factor. Big 5 is 1 if the firm is audited by Arthur Andersen, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & 
Young, KPMG, Price Waterhouse, Coopers and Lybrand or PricewaterhouseCoopers, and 0 for others. In addition, 
short auditor tenure leads to high asymmetry of information (Mansi et al., 2006). Therefore, AUDCH is 1 if the 
auditor is changed and otherwise 0. LOSS is proxy for risk firms, which are more likely to manage earnings. 
Therefore, I include LOSS to control for this effect. LOSS is 1 if the firm reports a loss during three consecutive 
years and 0 otherwise. This study also controls by years and groups of industry. 
 
IV. RESEARCH RESULT 
 
Sample Selection 
 
The initial sample consists of all U.S. non-financial industries from Compustat between 2004 and 2011. Firms in the 
transportation and public utilities industries (SIC codes 40-49) and in finance are excluded, as well as those in the 
insurance and real estate industries (SIC 60-67). As long as SG&A is available, advertising expenses and R&D are 
set to zero if this data concerning them is missing. Available data is included to calculate variables for each firm-
year. The accrual models and the models for normal and expected CFO, discretionary expenses, and production 
costs are estimated for each year and industry. There are at least 8 observations for each industry-year grouping. 
Final samples consist of 1,146 firm-year observations.  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the study. All variables are winsorized at the 1% level 
to reduce the influence of outliers. Absolute discretionary accruals (/DAMJ/) are 11.1% of firms’ assets, total current 
liabilities 14.7%, debt included in current liabilities 0.4%, and short-term borrowings 0.1%. /DAMJ/ mean of 11.1%, 
/DAKW/ mean of 9.9% and REM mean of 0.3% suggest that firms are engaging in earnings management. Total 
liabilities of firms’ assets are 22.0%, and 65.0% of the firms are audited by one of the Big 5 auditors. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (N=1,466) 
 Min Max Mean Quartile Standard Deviation 25% 50% 75% 
DAMJ -0.748 0.390 0.004 -0.054 0.021 0.084 0.167 
|DAMJ| 0.000 0.748 0.111 0.033 0.071 0.136 0.125 
DAKW -0.603 0.437 -0.004 -0.066 0.000 0.060 0.149 
|DAKW| 0.000 0.603 0.099 0.023 0.063 0.135 0.112 
-ABCFO -1.102 1.312 -0.014 -0.125 -0.030 0.074 0.297 
ABPROD -0.393 0.452 -0.001 -0.058 -0.010 0.048 0.130 
-ABDISEXP -2.575 1.426 0.019 -0.085 0.062 0.220 0.518 
REM -1.998 1.046 0.003 -0.124 0.022 0.214 0.440 
LCT 0.004 0.661 0.147 0.047 0.102 0.203 0.140 
DLC 0.000 0.230 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.020 
STB 0.000 0.129 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 
LEV 0.010 0.828 0.220 0.078 0.163 0.322 0.185 
SIZE 0.542 8.856 4.372 2.998 4.398 5.518 1.864 
MTB 0.242 38.476 3.888 1.313 2.458 4.418 5.206 
ROAt+1 -1.942 0.469 -0.145 -0.227 -0.046 0.074 0.398 
lagTAt+1 -4.531 0.477 -0.172 -0.148 -0.065 -0.013 0.563 
BIG6 0.000 1.000 0.650 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.477 
CFO/ASSETt-1 -1.826 0.675 -0.061 -0.141 -0.017 0.156 0.383 
LOSS 0.000 1.000 0.584 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.493 
AUDCH 0.000 1.000 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.286 
※ See research model to identify operational definition of variable 
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Table 2 presents correlations between variables. /DAMJ/ and /DAKW/ are positively related to measurement of debt 
included in current liabilities. This is probably because managers engage in accrual earnings management. MTB and 
LOSS are positively related to absolute discretionary accruals. SIZE, ROA, TA, BIG5, and CFO are negatively 
correlated with absolute discretionary accruals. Absolute discretionary accruals are correlated with most of the 
control variables. 
 
Table 2. Pearson Correlation (N=1,466) 
 DAMJ |DAMJ| DAKW |DAKW| -AB CFO 
ABP 
ROD 
-ABDI 
SEXP REM LCT DLC 
DAMJ 1.000          
|DAMJ| -0.366*** 1.000         
DAKW 0.902*** -0.243*** 1.000        
|DAKW| -0.290*** 0.853*** -0.151*** 1.000       
-ABCFO -0.204*** 0.151*** -0.031 0.170*** 1.000      
ABP ROD -0.142*** 0.141*** -0.078*** 0.108*** 0.116*** 1.000     
-ABDI SEXP 0.342*** -0.233*** 0.208*** -0.228*** -0.754*** 0.190*** 1.000    
REM 0.232*** -0.139*** 0.205*** -0.130*** -0.232*** 0.624*** 0.773*** 1.000   
LCT -0.066** 0.020 -0.044 0.040 0.145*** 0.073** -0.150*** -0.067** 1.000  
DLC -0.064** 0.117*** -0.057* 0.106*** 0.092*** 0.009 -0.085*** -0.050* 0.173*** 1.000 
STB 0.066** 0.017 0.056* 0.009 -0.080*** 0.019 0.107*** 0.076*** 0.121*** 0.218*** 
LEV -0.041 0.012 -0.036 0.023 0.106*** 0.036 -0.116*** -0.062** 0.740*** 0.178*** 
SIZE 0.068** -0.212*** -0.075** -0.219*** -0.187*** -0.061** 0.142*** 0.033 -0.042 0.026 
MTB -0.127*** 0.130*** -0.064** 0.157*** 0.248*** -0.044 -0.360*** -0.283*** 0.312*** 0.072** 
ROAt+1 0.208*** -.215*** -0.005 -0.237*** -0.405*** -0.066** 0.322*** 0.107*** -0.025 -0.047 
lagTAt-1 0.172*** -0.194*** 0.086*** -0.171*** -0.165*** -0.033 0.178*** 0.092*** -0.026 -0.027 
BIG6 0.011 -0.105*** -0.023 -0.098*** -0.043 -0.058 0.020 -0.017 0.037 -0.011 
CFO/Assett-1 0.166*** -0.294*** -0.099*** -0.310*** -0.624*** -0.094*** 0.469*** 0.145*** 0.025 -0.113*** 
LOSS -0.223*** 0.138*** -0.065** 0.146*** 0.230*** 0.143*** -0.118*** 0.055* -0.121*** 0.038 
AUDCH 0.017 0.044 0.028 0.051* -0.002 0.022 0.001 0.019 0.056* 0.044 
 
(Table 2 continued) 
 STB LEV SIZE MTB ROAt+1 lagTAt-1 BIG6 
CFO/ 
Assett-1 
LOSS AUDCH 
STB 1.000          
LEV 0.068** 1.000         
SIZE 0.012 0.227*** 1.000        
MTB -0.031 0.263*** -0.130*** 1.000       
ROAt+1 0.043 0.043 0.444*** -0.150*** 1.000      
lagTAt-1 0.035 -0.048 0.107*** -0.101*** 0.240*** 1.000     
BIG6 -0.079*** 0.168*** 0.495*** -0.072** 0.183*** 0.072** 1.000    
CFO/Assett-1 0.011 0.092*** 0.459*** -0.180*** 0.720*** 0.268*** 0.223*** 1.000   
LOSS -0.031 -0.170*** -0.459*** 0.007 -0.485*** -0.126*** -0.178*** -0.556*** 1.000  
AUDCH -0.026 0.028 -0.090*** 0.007 -0.035 -0.062** -0.121*** -0.049* 0.043 1.000 
※ *, **, *** are significant at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. See research model to identify operational definition of variables 
 
This suggests that this study controls for variables identified as significant factors for phenomenon of earnings 
management (Fung and Goodwin, 2013). 
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REM is negatively related to measurement of total current liabilities at 5% and is positively correlated with short-
term borrowings at a 1% level. This is probably because managers engage in real earnings management. LEV and 
MTB are negatively correlated with REM, and ROA, TA, and CFO are positively related to REM. Short-term debt is 
positively or negatively correlated with the real-based earnings management variables. 
 
Multivariate Analysis 
 
Table 3 reports results of multivariate regressions for accrual earnings management and real earnings management. 
Columns (1) through (3) present results of regressions for accrual earnings management. Following Dechow et al. 
(1995), this study measures the magnitude of discretionary accruals. Columns (4) through (6) present results of 
regressions for accrual earnings management. Following Kothari et al. (2005), performance-matched discretionary 
accruals are used. Columns (7) through (9) report results for real earnings management. 
 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 predict that the coefficient of total current liabilities should be positive. The coefficients of total 
current liabilities are statistically positive or negative but insignificant. The results of this regression indicate that 
total current liabilities do not have impact on accrual or real earnings management. 
 
Sub-hypotheses 1-1 and 2-1 predict that the coefficient of debt included in current liabilities should be positive. 
Columns (2), (5) and (8) in Table 4 provide the results. Debt included in current liabilities only has a statistically 
significant impact on /DAMJ/ and /DAKW/. These results suggest that firms are likely to manage accrual earnings 
when they face the liquidity risk of short-term debt. 
 
A similar relation between earnings management by /DAMJ/ and /DAKW/ and control variables is observed when 
debt included in current liabilities is used as the current debt proxies. Regarding the control variables, the significant 
coefficients are found to be generally in the expected directions. The signs of the coefficients on the SIZE, TA, CFO 
and LOSS are negative and significant. 
 
Sub-hypotheses 1-2 and 2-2 predict that the coefficient of short-term borrowings should be positive. However, short-
term borrowings are only shown to have a statistically significant impact on REM. These results indicate that the 
higher the short-term borrowings, the more real earnings management. Financial institutions are more concerned 
with monitoring financial statements to continuously gather information and update their evaluations of firm 
creditworthiness. There is also expected legal liability costs related to accrual earnings management, which causes 
firms to be more likely to manipulate real activities (Cohen et al., 2008). The coefficients of CFO and LOSS are 
positive and significant, and those of MTM and BIG5 are negative and significant. 
 
Abnormal CFO, abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary expenses are the proxies for real earnings 
management, and are the dependent variables in Table 4. When the dependent variable in regressions is abnormal 
CFO, the coefficient on short-term borrowings is negative and significant at a 1% level. These results indicate that 
there is certain real earnings management such as increasing price discounts and facilitating credit sales. When the 
dependent variable in regressions is abnormal production costs, the coefficient of total current liabilities is positive 
and significant at a 10% level. These results indicate that firms may engage in earnings management through 
overproduction and increased inventory to report lower cost of goods sold. Finally, when the dependent variable in 
regressions is abnormal discretionary expenses, the coefficient of short-term borrowings is positive and significant at 
a 1% level. These results indicate that firms may engage in earnings management through decreasing R&D, 
advertising expenses, and SG&A to report lower discretionary spending. 
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Table 3. The Effect of Short-term Debt on Earnings Management (N=1,466) 
Panel A 
 Dependent Variable: |DAMJ| 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
LCT 0.012 0.218     
DLC   0.076 2.651***   
STB     0.039 1.336 
LEV 0.025 0.493 0.016 0.492 0.028 0.880 
SIZE -0.117 -2.870*** -0.124 -3.226*** -0.120 -3.116*** 
MTB 0.065 2.113 0.065 2.118** 0.068 2.214** 
ROAt+1 0.022 0.529 0.019 0.443 0.019 0.445 
lagTAt+1 -0.114 -3.932*** -0.115 -3.999*** -0.115 -3.972*** 
BIG6 0.026 0.807 0.029 0.882 0.031 0.947 
CFO/ASSETt-1 -0.249 -5.606*** -0.236 -5.286*** -0.248 -5.593*** 
LOSS -0.083 -2.267** -0.082 -2.259** -0.083 -2.268** 
AUDCH 0.022 0.765 0.019 0.682 0.023 0.825 
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
MAXVIF 4.083 2.657 2.624 
F 7.822*** 8.129*** 7.898*** 
Adj. R2 0.139 0.144 0.140 
※ *, **, *** are significant at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. See research model to identify operational definition of variable 
 
Panel B 
 Dependent Variable: |DAKW| 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
LCT -0.001 -0.009     
DLC   0.062 2.164**   
STB     0.021 0.725 
LEV 0.044 0.883 0.030 0.914 0.041 1.275 
SIZE -0.122 -2.991*** -0.126 -3.253*** -0.122 -3.160*** 
MTB 0.086 2.764*** 0.085 2.755*** 0.087 2.812*** 
ROAt+1 0.016 0.376 0.013 0.304 0.014 0.329 
lagTAt+1 -0.084 -2.894*** -0.085 -2.946*** -0.084 -2.915*** 
BIG6 0.026 0.800 0.028 0.859 0.029 0.872 
CFO/ASSETt-1 -0.244 -5.479*** -0.233 -5.211*** -0.243 -5.472*** 
LOSS -0.070 -1.929* -0.070 -1.924* -0.070 -1.931* 
AUDCH 0.024 0.836 0.022 0.767 0.025 0.867 
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
MAXVIF 4.083 2.657 2.624 
F 7.755*** 7.961*** 7.778*** 
Adj. R2 0.137 0.141 0.138 
※ *, **, *** are significant at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. See research model to identify operational definition of variable 
 
(Table 3, Panel C continues on next page.) 
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(Table 3, Panel C continued) 
Panel C 
 Dependent Variable: REM 
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
LCT -0.012 -0.220     
DLC   -0.019 -0.636   
STB     0.063 2.146** 
LEV 0.029 0.568 0.024 0.731 0.013 0.396 
SIZE 0.024 0.584 0.028 0.718 0.026 0.666 
MTB -0.279 -8.827*** -0.279 -8.889*** -0.276 -8.793*** 
ROAt+1 0.035 0.828*** 0.036 0.848 0.030 0.691 
lagTAt+1 0.037 1.255 0.037 1.268 0.035 1.192 
BIG6 -0.064 -1.928* -0.065 -1.947* -0.057 -1.694* 
CFO/ASSETt-1 0.181 3.994*** 0.178 3.895*** 0.182 4.024*** 
LOSS 0.191 5.145*** 0.191 5.140*** 0.191 5.147*** 
AUDCH 0.010 0.343 0.010 0.363 0.013 0.439 
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
MAXVIF 4.083 2.657 2.624 
F 5.929*** 5.944*** 6.122*** 
Adj. R2 0.104 0.104 0.108 
※ *, **, *** are significant at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. See research model to identify operational definition of variable. 
 
 
Table 4. The Effect of Short-term Debt on Real Earnings Management (N=1,466) 
Panel A 
 Dependent Variable: -ABCFO 
Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
LCT 0.056 1.383     
DLC   -0.008 -0.400   
STB     -0.060 -2.853*** 
LEV 0.075 2.088** 0.116 4.853*** 0.121 5.152*** 
SIZE -0.009 -0.304 -0.021 -0.763 -0.021 -0.752 
MTB 0.093 4.128*** 0.096 4.295*** 0.093 4.154*** 
ROAt+1 0.029 0.940 0.029 0.960 0.034 1.129 
lagTAt+1 0.024 1.166 0.025 1.178 0.026 1.259 
BIG6 0.049 2.079** 0.049 2.076** 0.042 1.778* 
CFO/ASSETt-1 -0.851 -26.417*** -0.852 -26.257*** -0.852 -26.505*** 
LOSS -0.099 -3.724*** -0.098 -3.694*** -0.098 -3.699*** 
AUDCH -0.019 -0.930 -0.019 -0.912 -0.022 -1.055 
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
MAXVIF 4.083 2.657 2.624 
F 52.142*** 54.996*** 52.662*** 
Adj. R2 0.547 0.546 0.549 
※ *, **, *** are significant at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. See research model to identify operational definition of variable. 
 
(Table 4, Panel B and Panel C continues on next page) 
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(Table 4, Panel B and Panel C continued) 
Panel B 
 Dependent Variable: ABPRO 
Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
LCT 0.107 1.805*     
DLC   -0.007 -0.213   
STB     0.012 0.397 
LEV 0.014 0.266 0.089 2.537** 0.086 2.489** 
SIZE 0.030 0.698 0.006 0.142 0.005 0.128 
MTB -0.103 -3.112*** -0.096 -2.935*** -0.096 -2.914*** 
ROAt+1 0.029 0.657 0.030 0.674 0.029 0.640 
lagTAt+1 -0.010 -0.331 -0.010 -0.320 -0.010 -0.336 
BIG6 -0.064 -1.843* -0.064 -1.832* -0.062 -1.775* 
CFO/ASSETt-1 -0.075 -1.592 -0.075 -1.582 -0.074 -1.564 
LOSS 0.166 4.282*** 0.168 4.313*** 0.168 4.313*** 
AUDCH 0.002 0.077 0.003 0.088 0.003 0.099 
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
MAXVIF 4.083 2.657 2.624 
F 1.994*** 1.869*** 1.874*** 
Adj. R2 0.023 0.020 0.020 
※ *, **, *** are significant at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. See research model to identify operational definition of variable. 
 
Panel C 
 Dependent Variable: -ABDISEXP 
Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
β t-stat β t-stat β t-stat 
LCT -0.057 -1.217     
DLC   -0.002 -0.096   
STB     0.085 3.471*** 
LEV -0.019 -0.441 -0.057 -2.063** -0.068 -2.479** 
SIZE 0.022 0.646 0.036 1.090 0.034 1.053 
MTB -0.264 -10.076*** -0.268 -10.247*** -0.263 -10.113*** 
ROAt+1 0.016 0.447 0.016 0.443 0.008 0.222 
lagTAt+1 0.029 1.170 0.029 1.167 0.026 1.068 
BIG6 -0.070 -2.533** -0.070 -2.542** -0.060 -2.169** 
CFO/ASSETt-1 0.598 15.886*** 0.597 15.750*** 0.599 15.985*** 
LOSS 0.156 5.048*** 0.155 5.020*** 0.155 5.039*** 
AUDCH 0.006 0.253 0.006 0.252 0.010 0.405 
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
MAXVIF 4.083 2.657 2.624 
F 27.120 27.029*** 27.766 
Adj. R2 0.381 0.380 0.387 
※ *, **, *** are significant at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. See research model to identify operational definition of variable. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
Prior research suggests that the existence of debt provides a monitoring function for borrowers and reduces the 
agency costs of equity. However, other studies report that there is a possibility for earnings management even if the 
borrowings from financial institutions are high, inducing the monitoring of firms. 
 
Therefore, this study investigates whether or not short-term debt is related to earnings management. Short-term debt 
is divided into total current liabilities, debt in current liabilities and short-term borrowings. In addition, this study 
examines how short-term debt is related to how firms manage earnings. I use discretionary accruals and real 
operating decisions as the earnings management method. 
 
The study finds that total current liabilities have a statistically insignificant impact on accrual earnings management 
and real earnings management. Debt included in current liabilities only has a statistically significant impact on 
accrual earnings management, and short-term borrowings are only shown to have a statistically significant impact on 
real earnings management. These results indicate that managers engage in accrual earnings management of debt 
included in current liabilities and use real earnings management of short-term borrowings from financial institutions. 
 
In addition, abnormal CFO, abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary expenses are used as proxies for 
real earnings management. The coefficient on short-term borrowings is negative and significant in the abnormal 
CFO model, and the coefficient on total current liabilities is positive and significant in the abnormal production 
costs model. Finally, the coefficient on short-term borrowings is positive and significant in the abnormal 
discretionary expenses model. These results indicate that firms may engage in real earnings management to report 
adjusted earnings. 
 
Therefore, this evidence indicates that firms engage in accrual earnings management of debt in included current 
liabilities when they face the liquidity risk of short-term debt, and firms with debt financing constraints are likely to 
manage real earnings in spite of enhanced firm monitoring by lenders such as financial institutions.  
 
The findings in this study may have implications in the debate about the monitoring function of financial institutions 
such as banks. Future research may re-examine how firms manage their accrual or real earnings in mid- or long-term 
debt financing. 
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